Abstract-The record layer is the main bridge between TLS applications and internal sub-protocols. Its core functionality is an elaborate form of authenticated encryption: streams of messages for each sub-protocol (handshake, alert, and application data) are fragmented, multiplexed, and encrypted with optional padding to hide their lengths. Conversely, the subprotocols may provide fresh keys or signal stream termination to the record layer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the main protocol for secure communications over the Internet. With the fast growth of TLS traffic (now most of the Web [48] ), numerous concerns have been raised about its security, privacy, and performance. These concerns are justified by a history of attacks against deployed versions of TLS, often originating in the record layer.
History and Attacks Wagner and Schneier [49] report many weaknesses in SSL 2.0. The MAC construction offers very weak security regardless of the encryption strength. The padding length is unauthenticated, allowing an attacker to truncate fragments. Stream closure is also unauthenticated; although an end-of-stream alert was added in SSL 3.0, truncation attacks persist in newer TLS versions [12, 44] .
The original MAC-pad-encrypt mode is not generically secure [31] and is brittle in practice, despite encouraging formal results for specific algorithms [2, 11, 39] . Many padding oracle attacks have surfaced over the years, ranging from attacks exploiting straightforward issues (such as implementations sending padding error alerts after decryption) to more advanced attacks using side channels [1, 37] . Although well understood, padding oracle attacks remain difficult to prevent in TLS implementations [45] . The CBC mode of operation is also not secure against chosen-plaintext attacks when the IV is predictable (as in TLS 1.0), which is exploited in the BEAST attack [20] . Random explicit Figure 1 .
Multiplexing of sub-protocol streams by the record layer, depicting a TLS 1.3 draft-19 0-RTT handshake with re-keying.
weaknesses of the record layer by adopting a single AEAD mode for all ciphersuites, thus deprecating all legacy modes (MAC-only, MAC-pad-encrypt, RFC 7366 [26] encryptthen-MAC, compress-then-encrypt). The new AEAD mode is designed to be provably-secure and modular, supporting algorithms such as AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305 within the same framework. The usage of AEAD has also been improved: authentication no longer relies on associated data, whereas implicit nonces derived from initialization vectors (IV) and sequence numbers yield better security and performance.
What is the Record Layer? TLS involves establishing and using many encryption keys. In the key exchange literature, a common viewpoint is to treat each key generated in the handshake as belonging to a specific, independent application. Under this model, the handshake encryption key is used only by the handshake to encrypt its own messages, and must be separate from the application data key used only to encrypt application data fragments. This model does not fit the actual use of keys in TLS: it fails to capture TLS 1.2 renegotiation (where handshake messages are interleaved with the application data stream), TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication and re-keying, or even alerts in any TLS version. In our modularization of TLS, following Bhargavan et al. [11] , we consider that each sub-protocol of TLShandshake, change cipher spec (CCS), alert and application data (AppData)-defines its own data stream. The role of the record is to multiplex all of these streams into one, corresponding to network messages after fragmentation, formatting, padding, and optional record-layer encryption. Under this model, the record layer is the exclusive user for all non-exported keys generated by the handshake, and there is no need to assign keys to any given sub-protocol stream. Figure 1 illustrates the stream multiplexing for a TLS 1.3 connection with 0-RTT data and one re-keying from the point of view of the client. Separate channels are used for writing and reading. Within each channel, a band in the figure represents a stream, and arrows represent message fragments (incoming for left arrows, outgoing for right arrows) over time (flowing from left to right). Dashed arrows represent fragments used to signal key changes to the record layer. In TLS 1.2, CCS messages signal key changes; in TLS 1.3 this function is taken over by handshake messages.
Related Work Since the first draft of TLS 1.3 in April 2014, the handshake and key schedule have undergone significant analysis efforts [17, 18, 23, 28, 29, 32] as their design evolved over 19 iterations (at the time of writing). In contrast, few authors have analyzed changes to the record layer: Fischlin et al. [22] and Badertscher et al. [3] analyze an early draft that did not feature many of the current changes (for instance, it still relied on associated data to authenticate record meta-data), and Bellare and Tackmann [7] specifically focus on the way nonces are derived from IVs. This focus on the handshake protocol may be explained by the difficulty of analyzing the record independently of the handshake, and more generally, of defining the precise scope of its functionality. Authenticated and Confidential Channel Establishment (ACCE) [27, 33] is a game-based model that combines the handshake and the record protocols. While ACCE models capture complex features of TLS 1.2 such as renegotiation [25] , its focus is primarily on the handshake, and it is unclear how to capture features such as posthandshake authentication [19] . Other limits of ACCE models are discussed in [3] .
Our contributions We provide a reference implementation of the TLS record layer and its underlying cryptographic algorithms using the F programming language. We define security as an indistinguishability game and show a reduction with concrete bounds (Table I) for any distinguisher to standard, low-level cryptographic assumptions. Our proof structure is depicted in Figure 2 ; from the bottom up: 1) We build a generic library for one-time message authentication codes (MAC) based on the Wegman-CarterShoup construction. We implement the GHASH and Poly1305 algorithms, and we prove the functional correctness (with regards to mathematical specifications), memory safety, and encoding injectivity of the resulting low-level code ( §III). Similarly, we build a library for pseudo-random functions (PRF), and provide functionally-correct, memorysafe implementations for AES and ChaCha20 ( §IV). We express the security guarantees of these libraries using cryptographic idealizations backed by game-based assumptions.
2) We describe a generic AEAD construction that captures both RFC 5288 [41] for AES-GCM (as described in NIST SP800-38D [21] ) and RFC 7539 [38] for ChaCha20-Poly1305 through an interface compatible with RFC 5116 [36] . We show that this construction satisfies a standard notion of AEAD security ( §V) that combines indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) with ciphertext integrity (INT-CTXT). Our proof applies to our F implementation and, based on the idealizations of our two libraries, is verified by typing-as are the following three steps:
3) From AEAD, we build and verify stream encryption, which uses AEAD nonces and record sequence numbers according to the TLS version-specific format ( §VI).
4) From stream encryption, we build a length-hiding encryption interface by adding padding, the TLS-specific content type multiplexing, and version-specific associated data ( §VII).
5) From length-hiding stream encryption with multiplexing, we implement the TLS record layer by adding interfaces to the handshake and alert sub-protocols that extend streams to sequences of streams by installing and enabling keys ( §VIII). This captures novel protocol features of TLS 1.3 such as early application data (0-RTT and 0.5 RTT), late handshake messages, and re-keying. Based on our security bound, we propose a re-keying strategy that compensates for potential weaknesses in AES-GCM. 6) We evaluate our implementation of the TLS record layer ( §IX) by linking our AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphersuites to the handshake implementation of miTLS [11] . We confirm network interoperability with other TLS libraries both for TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 draft-14 and draft-18. Our code and formal development maximize reuse between TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
Additional Materials An extended version of this paper with additional details and proofs of the results in §III, §IV, and §V is available from a companion website https://project-everest.github.io/record/. This website also provides links to online repositories that include all verified code we report on in the paper, as well as instructions on how to verify, extract and run the code.
II. COMPOSITIONAL VERIFICATION BY TYPING
To implement and verify the record layer, we adopt a compositional approach to functional correctness and cryptographic security based on F [46] , a dependently-typed programming language. This section explains our approach on two examples: arithmetic in a prime field for the Poly1305 algorithm, and basic authenticated encryption. We refer the reader to Fournet et al. [24] for a general presentation of our approach and Barthe et al. [4] for a probabilistic semantics of F and additional cryptographic examples.
We use F not only to implement cryptographic constructions, but also as the formal syntax for their gamebased security definitions. This is akin to the approach taken by Bhargavan et al. [13] in their proof of a TLS 1.2 handshake implementation using F7, an ancestor of F . In contrast to F7, F supports an imperative programming style that is closer to pseudo-code used by cryptographers in code-based games [5] . For most of the paper, we use such pseudo-code instead of more precise and verbose F code. We do not assume familiarity with F and elide details of its syntax, such as type annotations, that are not relevant for the developments in this paper.
Functional Correctness of Poly1305
As a first example in F syntax, we specify arithmetic in the field GF (2 130 − 5) for the Poly1305 MAC algorithm as follows: let p = 2^130 − 5 ( * the prime order of the field * ) type elem = n:nat {n < p} ( * the type of field elements * ) let x +@ y : Tot elem = (x + y) % p ( * field addition * ) let x * @ y : Tot elem = (x * y) % p ( * field multiplication * ) This code uses F mathematical (unbounded) natural numbers to define the prime order p of the field and the type of field elements. (The formula {n < p} line 2 states that this type is inhabited by natural numbers n smaller than p.) The code also defines two infix operators +@ and * @ for addition and multiplication in the field, relying on primitive, unbounded integer arithmetic. Their result is annotated with types Tot elem, to indicate that these operations are pure total functions that return field elements. Hence, the F typechecker automatically checks that their result is in the field; it would report an error if e.g. we omitted the reduction modulo p. These operations are convenient to specify polynomial computations (see §III-B) but highly inefficient.
Instead, typical 32-bit implementations of Poly1305 represent field elements as mutable arrays of 5 unsigned 32-bit integers, each holding 26 bits. This low-level representation evenly spreads out the bits across the integers, so that carry-overs during arithmetic operations can be delayed. It also enables an efficient modulo operation for p. We show below an excerpt of the interface of our lower level verified implementation, relying on the definitions above to specify its correctness. The type repr defines the representation of field elements as F buffers (i.e., mutable arrays) of 5 32-bit integers. It is marked as abstract, to hide this representation from the rest of the code. Functions are declared with a series of argument types (separated by → ) ending with a return type and an effect (e.g. Tot or ST). Functions may have logical preand post-conditions that refer to their arguments, their result, and their effects on the memory. If they access buffers, they typically have a pre-condition requiring their caller to prove that the buffers are 'live' in the current memory (that is, they have been allocated and haven't been de-allocated yet) and they also explicitly state which buffers they modify.
The total function select is used only in specifications; it reads the value of an element from the program memory. We use it, for example, in the stateful specification of multiply. In the types above, we keep the memory argument implicit, writing select e0 and select e0 for the values of e0 in initial and final memories, respectively. (In real F code, pre-and post-conditions take these memories as explicit arguments.)
The multiply function is marked as ST, to indicate a stateful computation that may use temporary stack-based allocations. It requires that its arguments e0 and e1 be live and disjoint; it computes the product of its two arguments and overwrites e0 with the result. Its post-condition specifies the result in terms of the abstract field multiplication of the arguments.
Implementing and proving that multiply meets its mathematical specification involves hundreds of lines of source code, relying on a custom Bignum library with lemmas on integer representations and field arithmetic (see §IX). Such code is easy to get wrong, but once F typechecks it, we are guaranteed that our low-level code is safe (e.g. it never accesses buffers out of bound, or de-allocated buffers) and functionally correct (since their results are fully specified). All F types and specifications are then erased, so that the compiled code only performs efficient low-level operations.
Authenticated Encryption: Real Interface Let us consider a simplified version of the authenticated encryption (AE) functionality at the core of the TLS record layer. In F , we may write an AE module with the following interface: Plaintexts and ciphertexts are represented here as immutable bytestrings of fixed lengths p and c . We frequently rely on type abbreviations to statically enforce length checks for fixed-length bytestrings using lbytes , and for boundedlength bytestrings using bbytes . (Our presentation uses immutable bytestrings for simplicity, whereas our recordlayer implementation also uses mutable buffers of bytes.) Next, our interface defines an abstract type key; values of this type can only be generated via keygen and accessed via encrypt and decrypt. The internal representation of keys is hidden from all other modules to protect their integrity and secrecy. The function keygen needs to generate randomness by calling an effectful external function; so we give this function the ST effect to indicate that the computation is impure and stateful (even though it does not explicitly modify the memory). In particular, two calls to keygen may yield different results. The function encrypt would typically generate a nonce for use in the underlying AE construction, and hence is also marked as stateful. In contrast, decrypt is deterministic, so is marked with the Tot effect. Its result is an optional plain value: either Some p if decryption succeeds, or None otherwise. In pseudo-code we write ⊥ for brevity.
Our interface does not express any security guarantees yet, but it does require a functional correctness guarantee, namely that decryption undoes encryption.
Authenticated Encryption: Security Given an AE scheme, one usually measures its concrete security as the advantage of an adversary A that attempts to guess the value of b in the following game:
The adversary A is a program that can call the two oracle functions to encrypt and decrypt using a secret key k. In the real case (b = 0) they just call the real AE implementation. In the ideal case (b = 1), Encrypt returns a randomly sampled ciphertext and stores the associated plaintext in a log L, while Decrypt performs decryption by looking up the plaintext in the log, returning ⊥ when there is no plaintext associated with the ciphertext. Ideal AE is perfectly secure, inasmuch as the ciphertext does not depend on the plaintext. Thus, we define AE security by saying that the attacker cannot easily distinguish between the real and ideal cases.
For this game, we define A's advantage probabilistically as |2 Pr[Ae(A, AE)] − 1|, e.g. an adversary flipping a coin to guess b will succeed with probability 1 2 and has 0 advantage. In this paper, we adopt a more flexible notation for indistinguishability games: we keep the sampling of b and the call to the adversary implicit, and instead indicate the oracles available to this adversary. Hence, we write the game above (with the same oracles) equivalently as
This notation facilitates the re-use of oracles for building other games, much like F modules. In general, we write G b to refer to an indistinguishability game G where the adversary A tries to guess the value of the random bit b by calling the oracles returned by G. For all such games, we equivalently define the advantage as Pr[A where the (private) key representation now includes both the real key and the ideal encryption log. The encrypt function uses k.log to access the current log, and ++ to append a new entry, much as the Encrypt oracle.
Embedding games in F modules

Idealization Interfaces
The idealized module AE b can be shown to implement the following typed interface that reflects the security guarantee of the Ae b game:
The interface declares keys as abstract, hiding both the real key value and the ideal log, and relies on the log to specify the effects of encryption and decryption. To this end, it provides a log function that reads the current content of the log-a sequence of ciphertexts and plaintexts. This function is marked as Spec, indicating that it may be used only in specification and will be discarded by the compiler after typechecking.
Each of the 3 ensures clauses above uses this proof-only function to specify the state of the log before (log k) and after the call (log k ). Hence, the interface states that, in the ideal case, the function keygen creates a key with an empty log; encrypt k p returns a ciphertext c and extends the log for k with an entry mapping c to p; and decrypt k c returns exactly the result of looking up for c in the current log. This postcondition formally guarantees that decrypt succeeds if and only if it is passed a ciphertext that was generated by encrypt; in other words it guarantees both functional correctness and authentication (a notion similar to INT-CTXT).
AE b is also parametrized by a module Plain b that defines abstract plaintexts, with an interface that allows access to their concrete byte representation only when b = 0 (for real encryption). By typing AE b , we verify that, when b = 1, our idealized functionality is independent (informationtheoretically) from the values of the plaintexts it processes.
From the viewpoint of the application, the plaintext abstraction guarantees that AE 1 preserves the confidentiality and integrity of encrypted data (as in classic information flow type systems). An application can rely on this fact to prove application-level guarantees. For instance, an application may prove, as an invariant, that only well-formed messages are encrypted under a given key, and thus that parsing and processing a decrypted message always succeeds. Equipped with this definition and our idealized interface for AE, we can prove the security of programs using ideal AE (b = 1), say with advantage , and then bound the advantage of the same programs using real AE (b = 0) to
Probabilistic Semantics
We can either assume that this definition holds for our real AE module with an Ae that is small for realistic adversaries (possibly relying on functional correctness and some prior proof of security), or we can prove that our AES-GCM module (say) achieves some bound on Ae by reduction to a simpler assumptions on the AES cipher module. In later sections, we will show how we can precisely compute the adversary A's advantage in the game above from a related adversary B's advantage in winning the PRF game on the underlying cipher (e.g. AES). The proof relies on standard cryptographic game transformations that are applied, on paper, at the level of F code, combined with functional correctness proofs about the real and ideal code, verified automatically by F .
Games vs Idealized Modules
We conclude this presentation of our approach by discussing differences between the games on paper and the modules of our implementation.
Standard-compliant modules include many details elided in informal games; they also use lower level representations to yield more efficient code, and require additional type annotations to keep track of memory management.
These modules are part of a general-purpose verified cryptographic libraries, providing real functionality (when idealizations flags are off) so they always support multiple instances of their functionality. Here for instance, AE b has a function to generate keys, passed as parameters to the encrypt function, whereas the game oracle uses a single, implicit key. (This difference can usually be handled by a standard hybrid-argument reduction.)
Modules rely on the F type system to enforce the rules of the games. Hence, dynamic checks in games (say, to test whether a nonce has already been used) are often replaced with static pre-conditions on typed adversaries. Similarly, types enforce many important but trivial conditions, such as the length of oracle arguments, and are often kept implicit in the paper.
III. ONE-TIME MACS
Anticipating on §V, the AEAD construction uses fresh key materials for each message, so we consider authentication when keys are used to compute at most one MAC.
We treat two main constructions, GHASH and Poly1305, using the same definitions, code, and proofs, inasmuch as possible. We initially suppose that the whole key is freshly generated for each MAC (as in ChaCha20-Poly1305) before presenting the general case where a part of the key is shared between multiple MACs (as in AES-GCM).
A. One-time MAC functionality and security
We outline below our interface for message authentication code (MAC), omitting its functional specification (see §IX). This interface defines concrete byte formats for keys, tags, and messages. Authenticated messages are strings of at most m bytes that comply with an implementation-specific well-formedness condition. (We need such a condition for GHASH.) We let m range over well-formed messages.
Key-generation functions are marked as stateful (ST) to reflect their use of random sampling. Static keys of type key 0 may be used to generate multiple one-time keys of type key.
(For example, keygen may concatenate the static key with k − k0 random bytes.) To begin with, we assume k0 = 0 so that k 0 is the empty string ε.
The two main functions produce and verify MACs. Their correctness is captured in the verify post-condition of mac: verification succeeds at least on the tags correctly produced using mac with matching key and message.
One-Time Security MAC security is usually defined using computational unforgeability, as in the following game:
The oracle permits the adversary a single chosen-message query (recorded in log) before trying to produce a forgery. The advantage of A playing the UF-1CMA game is defined
We seek a stronger property for AEAD-the whole ciphertext must be indistinguishable from random bytesand we need a decisional game for type-based composition, so we introduce a variant of unforgeability that captures indistinguishability from a random tag (when r is set).
Definition 2 (IND-UF-1CMA):
be the advantage of an adversary A that makes q v Verify queries on messages of length at most m in the following game:
In this game, the MAC oracle is called at most once, on some chosen message m; it returns a tag t and logs (m, t). Conversely, Verify is called q v times before and after calling MAC. When b is set, the game idealizes MAC in two ways: verification is replaced by a comparison with the log; and (when r is also set) the tag is replaced with random bytes.
We show (in the full paper) that our definition implies UF-1CMA when q v ≥ 1 and that random tags are neither necessary nor sufficient for unforgeability. We are not aware of much prior work on Mac1 with r set; a pairwise independent hash function would satisfy our IND-UF-1CMA definition but may require longer keys [42] .
Multi-Instance Security with a Shared Key In the AEAD construction, we instantiate a one-time MAC for every encryption and decryption. AES-GCM uses a static MAC key derived from the AEAD key and shared between all MAC instances. This state sharing is not captured by the games above. To this end, we extend the Mac1 b game into a multi-instance version MMac1 b with a setup that invokes the keygen 0 function to generate any key materials reused across instances.
In the multi-instance case it is convenient to support two kinds of instances: honest instances are created with Keygen and idealized as in Mac1 b ; dishonest instances are created with Coerce and use the real implementation regardless of b. (Formally Coerce does not make the model stronger, as an adversary can run all algorithms on his own. However, the finer model is useful in hybrid arguments and for composition with a PRF in §IV.)
Definition 3 (m-IND-UF-1CMA):
be the advantage of an adversary A that creates q i instances and makes q v Verify queries overall on messages of length at most m in the game:
We confirm that Mac1 is a special case of MMac1 security and that, even with a static key, it suffices to consider a single verification query. (The proofs are in the full paper.)
Verified Implementation m-IND-UF-1CMA security reflects the type-based security specification of our idealized module MMac1 b , which has an interface of the form
The types of mac and verify express the gist of our security property: the specification function log gives access to the current content of the log associated with a one-time key; mac requires that the log be empty (None in F ) thereby enforcing our one-time MAC discipline; verify ensures that, when b is set, verification succeeds if and only if mac logged exactly the same message and tag. Their implementation is automatically verified by typing MMac1 b . However, recall that typing says nothing about the security loss incurred by switching b-this is the subject of the next subsection.
Our verified implementation of MMac1 b supports the two constructions described next, including code and functional correctness proofs for their algorithms. It also provides a more efficient interface for computing MACs incrementally. Instead of actually concatenating all authenticated materials in a message, the user creates a stateful hash, then repeatedly appends 16-byte words to the hash, and finally calls mac or verify on this hash, with a type that binds the message to the final hash contents in their security specifications. Our code further relies on indexed abstract types to separate keys and hashes for different instances of the functionality, and to support static key compromise.
B. Wegman-Carter-Shoup (WCS) Constructions
Next, we set up notations so that our presentation applies to multiple constructions, including GHASH and Poly1305; we factor out the encodings to have a core security assumption on sequences of field elements; we verify their injectivity; we finally prove concrete bounds in general, and in particular for GHASH and Poly1305.
From bytes to polynomials and back In addition to fixed lengths for keys and tags, the construction is parameterized by
• a field F;
• an encoding function · from messages to polynomials in F, represented as sequences of coefficients m ∈ F * .
• a truncation function from e ∈ F to tag(e) ∈ byte t ;
The key consists of two parts: an element r ∈ F and a onetime pad s ∈ byte t . We assume that r and s are sampled uniformly at random, from some R ⊆ F and from byte t , respectively. We write r s ← k for the parsing of key materials into r and s, including the encoding of r into R.
Generic Construction Given a message m encoded into the
the tag is computed as:
where the blinding operation is related to addition in F (see specific details below). We refer to hash r (m), the part of the construction before blinding, as the hash.
Next, we describe the two instantiations employed in TLS.
GHASH [21] uses the Galois field GF (2 128 ), defined as the
, that is, the field of polynomials with Boolean coefficients modulo the irreducible polynomial x 128 +x 7 +x 2 +x+1. Such polynomials are represented as 128-bit vectors. Conveniently, polynomial addition, the blinding operation , and its inverse simply correspond to 128-bit XOR. Polynomial multiplication is also efficiently supported on modern processors. The message encoding · splits the input message into 16-byte words, seen as integers in 0..2 128 − 1; and the tag truncation is the identity. For AES-GCM, GHASH has a keygen0 function that samples a single r $ ← GF (2 128 ) shared across all MAC instances.
Poly1305 [8] uses the field GF (p) for p = 2 130 − 5, that is, the prime field of integer addition and multiplication modulo p, whose elements can all be represented as 130-bits integers. Its message encoding · similarly splits the input message into 16-byte words, seen as integers in 0..2 128 − 1, then adds 2 to each of these integers, where is the word length in bits. (Hence, the encoding precisely keeps track of the length of the last word; this feature is unused for AEAD, which applies its own padding to ensure = 128.) The truncation function is tag(e) = e mod 2 128 . The blinding operation and its inverse are addition and subtraction modulo 2 128 . For ChaCha20-Poly1305, both r and s are single-use ( k0 = 0) but our proof also applies to the original Poly1305-AES construction [8] where r is shared.
Injectivity Properties We intend to authenticate messages, not just polynomial coefficients. To this end, we instantiate our wellformed predicate on messages and show (in F ) that
where Poly.equals specifies the equality of two formal polynomials by comparing their sequences of coefficients, extending the shorter sequence with zero coefficients if necessary. This enables the (conditional) composition of MACs with suitable well-formedness predicates for AEAD in TLS. This is required for GHASH as it is otherwise subject to 0-message truncations. We verify that the property above suffices to prove that both encodings are secure, and also that it holds in particular once we define wellformed as the range of formatted messages for AEAD (which are 16-byte aligned and embed their own lengths; see §V). We also confirm by typing that, with Poly1305, there is no need to restrict messages: its encoding is injective for all bytestrings [8, Theorem 3.2] .
Security We give a theorem similar to those in prior work [8, 30, 43] but parameterized by the underlying field F, encoding · , truncation tag, and blinding operation . The theorem covers all uses of AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 in TLS.
Consider the MMac1 definition, covering both shared and fresh values for r. Let q v be the number of oracle calls to Verify (for which log[n] = (m , t )) and d a bound on the size (expressed in number of field elements) of the messages in calls to Mac and Verify. The proof (in the full paper) uses Lemma 2 and establishes a bound d·τ |R| for an adversary that makes a single Verify query. This bound follows from an d·τ |R| -almost--universal property, which has been separately proved for GHASH [35] and Poly1305 [8] ; the full paperalso includes its proof for all instantiations of hash r for TLS.
Concrete bounds for GHASH:
The range size for r is 2
128
and there is no tag truncation, hence by Lemma 2 we get a straight = d·qv 2 128 , so for TLS the main risk is a failure of our PRF assumption on AES, discussed in §VII. This interface specifies an abstract type for keys and a keygeneration algorithm. (Type abstraction ensures that these keys are used only for PRF computations.) It also specifies concrete, fixed-length bytestrings for the domain and range of the PRF, and a function to compute the PRF. We refer to the PRF outputs as blocks. As usual, we define security as indistinguishability from a uniformly random function with lazy sampling.
Concrete bound for
Definition 4 (PRF security):
The AEAD constructions we consider use PRFs both to generate keys for the one-time MAC used to authenticate the ciphertext and to generate a one-time pad for encryption and decryption. Accordingly, we partition the domain and use a specialized security definition, with a separate eval function for each usage of the PRF. (This will enable us to give more precise types to each of these functions.)
We assume the PRF domain consists of concatenations of a fixed-sized counter j and a nonce n, written j n. This notation hides minor differences between AEAD algorithm specifications, e.g. AES-GCM uses n j instead j n. Our implementation handles these details, and verifies that j n is injective for all admissible values of j and n.
For key generation, AES-GCM uses the PRF to derive both a static MAC key k 0 generated from the PRF (with nonce and counter 0) and a 1-time MAC key for each nonce (with counter 1) whereas Poly1305 uses a pure 1-time MAC key for each nonce (with counter 0). To handle both cases uniformly, we introduce a parameter j 0 ∈ {0, 1} to shift the counter before concatenation with the nonce. In the following, we assume a compatible MAC, meaning that
For pad generation, counter mode encrypts plaintext blocks as p ⊕ eval(j n) and decrypts by applying the same pad to the ciphertext. In the PrfCtr game below, we separate encryption and decryption, and we fuse the block generation and the XOR, so that we can give separate types to plaintexts and ciphertexts. ( 
The proof is in the full paper. Intuitively, we have a perfect reduction because, in all cases, the specialized game still samples a single fresh block for each j n for a single purpose, and returns a value computed from that block.
In the next section, once b holds and the MAC has been idealized, we will use two oracles that further idealize encryption and decryption:
. This step is valid provided the block at j n is used for encrypting a single p and decrypting the resulting c. The oracles enforce this restriction dynamically (on their second lines) whereas our code enforces it statically, using type-based preconditions on EvalEnx or EvalDex implied by the AEAD invariant of §V.
Verified Implementation Lemma 3 and the subsequent step are not currently verified by typing. (Still, note that the sampling of c instead of o is justified by F 's probabilistic semantic and could be verified using the relational typing rule for sample in RF [4] )
We use an idealized PRF module with two idealization flags (for b and for b ) that directly corresponds to the specialized game PrfCtr b,b parametrized by a Cipher module that implements real AES128, AES256, and ChaCha20 (depending on an algorithmic parameter alg) and by a MAC module. The separation of the PRF domain is enforced by typing: depending on alg, j 0 , j, b, and b , its range includes keys, blocks, and pairs (p, c).
V. FROM MAC AND PRF TO AEAD
We implement the two main AEAD constructions used by TLS 1.3 and modern ciphersuites of TLS 1.2. We show that their composition of a PRF and a one-time MAC yields a standard notion of AEAD security. Our proof is generic and carefully designed to be modular and TLS-agnostic: we share our AEAD code between TLS 1.2 and 1.3, and plan to generalize it for other protocols such as QUIC.
AEAD functionality Our authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) has a real interface of the form with two functions to encrypt and decrypt messages with associated data of variable lengths, and types that specify the cipher length as a function of the plain length. ( 
Our definition generalizes AE in §II; it has a richer domain with plaintext and associated data of variable lengths; a function cipherlen from plaintext lengths to ciphertext lengths; and nonces n. It similarly maintains a log of encryptions, indexed by nonces. Crucially, Encrypt uses the log to ensure that each nonce is used at most once for encryption.
Generic AEAD Construction Given a PRF and a compatible MAC, AEAD splits plaintexts into blocks which are then blinded by pseudo-random one-time pads generated by calling PRF on increasing counter values, as shown in §IV. (Blocks for MAC keys and the last mask may require truncation.)
To authenticate the ciphertext and associated data, the construction formats them into a single 16-byte-aligned buffer (ready to be hashed as polynomial coefficients as described in §III) using an encoding function declared as val encode: bbytes p × bbytes a → Tot bbytes ( p + a + 46) and implemented (in pseudo-code) as where the auxiliary function split (b) splits the bytestring b into a sequence of r non-empty bytestrings, all of size , except for the last one which may be shorter.
; where zeros( ) is the bytestring of zero bytes; and where length 8 (n) is the 8-byte representation of the length of n. Thus, our encoding adds minimal zero-padding to a and c, so that they are both 16-bytes aligned, and appends a final 16-byte encoding of their lengths.
Recall that the domain of MAC messages is restricted by the wellformed predicate. We now define wellformed b = ∃ (c:cipher) (a:ad). b = encode c a and typecheck the property listed in §III that ensures injectivity of the polynomial encoding.
The rest of the AEAD construction is defined below, using an operator otp ⊕ p that abbreviates the expression truncate(otp, |p|) ⊕ p, and a function untag 16 that separates the ciphertext from the tag.
The main result of this section is that it is Aead-secure when PRF is Prf-secure and MAC is MMac1-secure:
Theorem 2 (AEAD construction): Given A against Aead, we construct B against Prf and C against MMac1, with:
where q b (the number of distinct queries to the PRF) satisfies:
Proof sketch: The proof is in the full paper; it relies on the PrfCtr b,b and MMac1 b idealizations; it involves a sequence of transformations from Aead 0 to Aead 1 that inline successively more idealizations. Therefore, we introduce a parametric game AeadCtr(X) for any game X that returns EvalKey, EvalEnx, EvalDex, Mac, and Verify oracles: Verified Implementation We outline below the idealized interface of our main AEAD b module built on top of (the idealized interfaces of) PrfCtr b,b and MMac1 b , both taken as cryptographic assumption, and documented by the games with the same names on paper. We focus on types for encryption and decryption: abstract type key ( * stateful key, now containing the log * ) val log: memory → key → Spec (seq (nonce × ad × cipher × plain) val keygen : unit → ST (k:key) (ensures b ⇒ log k = ∅) val encrypt: k:key → n:nonce → a:ad → p:plain → ST (c:cipher) (requires b ⇒ lookup_nonce n (log k) = None) (ensures (b ⇒ log k = log k ++ (n,a,c,p))) val decrypt: k:key → n:nonce → a:ad → c:cipher
As in §II, we have a multi-instance idealization, with a log for each instance stored within an abstract, stateful key; and we provide a proof-only function log to access its current contents in logical specifications. Hence, key generation allocates an empty log for the instance; encryption requires that the nonce be fresh and records its results; and decryption behaves exactly as a table lookup, returning a plaintext if, and only if, it was previously stored in the log by calling encryption with the same nonce and additional data. This step of the construction is entirely verifiable by typing. To this end, we supplement its implementation with a precise invariant that relates the AEAD log to the underlying PRF table and MAC logs. For each entry in the log, we specify the corresponding entries in the PRF table (one for the one-time MAC key, and one for each block required for encryption) and, for each one-time MAC key entry, the contents of the MAC log (an encoded message and the tag at the end of the ciphertext in the AEAD log entry). By typing the AEAD code that implements the construction, we verify that the invariant is preserved as it completes its series of calls to the PRF and MAC idealized interfaces. Hence, although our code for decryption does not actually decrypt by a log lookup, we prove that (when b holds) its results always matches the result of a lookup on the current log. As usual, by setting all idealization flags to false, the verified code yields our concrete TLS implementation.
Security bounds Theorem 2 can be specialized to provide precise security bounds for the various AEAD ciphersuites:
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VI. FROM AEAD TO STREAM ENCRYPTION (STAE)
TLS requires stream encryption: message fragments must be received and processed in the order they were sent, thereby defeating attempts to delete or re-order network traffic. To this end, encryption and decryption use a local sequence number to generate distinct, ordered nonces for AEAD.
In practice, it is difficult to prevent multiple honest servers from decrypting and processing the same 0-RTT encrypted stream. Since decryption is now stateful, we must generalize our model to support multiple parallel decryptors for each encryptor. In our security definitions, we thus add a genD oracle to generate new decryptors (with local sequence numbers set to zero) from a given encryptor.
Otherwise, the stateful construction is quite simple: TLS 1.3 combines the sequence number with a static, random 'initialization vector' (IV) in the key materials to generate pairwise-distinct nonces for encrypting fragments using AEAD. In contrast, TLS 1.2 nonces concatenate the static IV with a per-fragment explicit IV that is sent alongside the ciphertext on the network (except for ciphersuites based on ChaCha20-Poly1305 which follow the TLS 1.3 nonce format). Some TLS 1.2 implementations incorrectly use uniformly random explicit IVs [15] . This is much inferior to using the sequence number because of the high collision risk on 64 bits. Therefore, in our implementation, we use the following nonce construction:
where the indices indicate lengths in bytes. The use of longer static IVs in TLS 1.3 is a practical improvement, as (informally) it acts as an auxiliary secret input to the PRF and may improve multi-user security [7] . This is particularly clear for ChaCha20, where the key, nonce, and counter are just copied side by side to the initial cipher state. We easily verify (by typing) that both constructions are injective for 0 ≤ seqn < 2 64 , which is required (also by typing) to meet the 'fresh nonce' pre-condition for calling AEAD encryption. Formally, the state invariant for StAE encryption is that 0 ≤ seqn < 2 64 and the underlying AEAD log has an entry for every nonce n computed from a sequence number smaller than seqn.
StAE functionality A stream authenticated encryption functionality StAE implements the following interface: We omit type declarations for plain, cipher and ad as they are similar to AEAD. For TLS, the length of additional data a can be 0 (TLS 1.3) or 13 (TLS 1.2) and the length of IVs iv is 12. Compared to previous functionalities, the main change is that keys are replaced by states that embed a 64-bit sequence number. Accordingly, in this section we assume that at most 2 64 fragments are encrypted. The stateful function gen initializes the encryptor state used by the encryption algorithm, while genD initializes a decryptor state used by the decryption algorithm. The stateful encrypt and decrypt functions require that the sequence number in the key state does not overflow (seqn s < qe) and ensure that it is incremented (only on success in the case of decryption). In pseudo-code, authenticated stream encryption is constructed as follows:
be the advantage of an adversary A that makes q e encryption queries and q d decryption queries in the game below.
The game involves a single encryptor, a table of decryptors D, and a log of encryptions E. For brevity, it relies on the stateful encryptor and decryptors specified above, e.g. encrypts increments s.seqn and Encrypt records the encryption with sequence number s.seqn − 1. (Equivalently, it could keep its own shadow copies of the sequence numbers.) In contrast with AEAD, decryption only succeeds for the current sequence number of the decryptor.
Our definition corresponds most closely to level-4 (stateful) LHAE of [16] . In both definitions the requirement is that decrypt only successfully decrypted a prefix of what was sent. A difference is that we do not require real decryption to continue rejecting ciphertexts upon decryption failure. We also leave length-hiding and stream termination to §VII.
Theorem 3 (Stae perfectly reduces to Aead): Given A against Stae, we construct B against Aead with We are now ready to use stream encryption for protecting TLS 1.3 traffic, which consists of a sequence of protocolmessage fragments, each tagged with their content type, while hiding their content, their type, and their actual size before padding. The steps taken by the record layer to construct encrypted fragments are depicted in Figure 3 , with apparent size after padding. The last line adds the (unprotected) record header; for backward compatibility, it pretends to be a TLS 1.0 AppData record irrespective of its actual encrypted content type. On the other hand, TLS does not attempt to hide the record boundaries (as e.g. SSH) so we do not expect indistinguishability from random for the resulting record.
Formatting: Content Type and Length Hiding Encryption and decryption rely on formatting and padding functions over a type fragment indexed by a length indicating the public maximal length of its content, specified as follows:
type len = n:nat {n ≤ 2 14 } ( * valid record length in TLS * ) type fragment ( :len) = {ct:byte; data:bbytes } val parse: :len → lbytes ( +1) → Tot (option (fragment )) val format: :len → f:fragment → Tot (p:lbytes ( +1)) (ensures parse p = Some f)
These functions must be carefully implemented to prevent any side channel. We also construct and parse records into headers and payloads using functions val parse_record: r:record → Tot (option (n:nat × c:lbytes n)) val format_record: n:nat → c:lbytes n → Tot (r:record) (ensures parse_record r = Some (n,c))
These function specifications suffice to establish our theorems below. We now give the concrete format function for TLS 1.3:
where pad 0 n is the string of n 0x00 bytes. We verify the post-condition of format by typing. We omit the corresponding parse function and the code for processing headers.
The implementation of parse and format, and the converse function for parsing a bytestring into a fragment value, require precautions to avoid leaking the actual contents length using side-channels. The code for processing headers does not depend on the fragment, only on its length after padding.
Stream Closure As explained in §VI, stream integrity ensures that decrypted traffic is a prefix of encrypted traffic. Complementarily, the TLS record layer relies on well-defined final fragments, specified as a predicate val final: fragment → Tot bool, to ensure that no further encryptions are performed on a stream after sending such a fragment.
For LHAE, we extend the stateful key of StAE to record the termination status of the stream, which can be queried with the predicate val closed: mem → state r → Spec bool. Furthermore, we extend the post-condition of encryption to ensure that the state s after encrypting fragment f satisfies closed s = final f. Therefore, upon receiving a final fragment, the decryptor is guaranteed to have received the whole data stream. LHSE Construction and Game The construction is:
with the same state as StAE-we omit the unmodified functions for generating encryptors and decryptors. When a final fragment is sent or received, we erase the StAE state. The TLS 1.3 construction uses empty associated data, relying on implicit authentication of the underlying key and sequence number. (Our code also supports the older TLS 1.2 construction, which uses 13 bytes of associated data in total, obtained by appending the protocol version and the content type to the sequence number of stream encryption.) Definition 8 (Lhse): Given LHSE, let Lhse (A[q e , q d ]) be the advantage of an adversary A that makes q e encryption queries and q d decryption queries in the game below.
where f 0 (respectively, f 1 ) is a fragment (respectively, a final fragment), with fixed content type and data 0 .
The game logs the encryption stream in F , indexed by fragment sequence numbers and ciphertexts. It has an oracle for creating decryptors; it stores their state in a table D, indexed by some abstract d chosen by the adversary. It does not model stream termination, enforced purely by typing the stream content.
Theorem 4 (Lhse perfectly reduces to Stae): Given A against Stae, we construct B against Aead with
where a is 0 for TLS 1.3 and 13 for TLS 1.2.
Multi-Stream LHSE In the next section (as in our interface above), we use a multi-instance Lhse game, defined below.
For every fresh index i passed to Gen, we spawn an instance of Lhse and we record its state and oracle in table E. In all other cases, the oracles above now look up the shared instance at i and forward the call to the instance oracle. Table I gives the concrete bounds by ciphersuites, setting p to 2 14 + 1 and a to 0 (or 13 for TLS 1.2). ChaCha20 uses a Davies-Meyer construction and is considered a good PRF. For AES-GCM ciphersuites, blocks are relatively small (16 bytes) so we incur a loss of 2 129 by the PRP/PRF switching lemma [6] , intuitively accounting for the probability of observing collisions on ciphertext blocks and inferring the corresponding plaintext blocks are different. As observed e.g. by Luykx and Paterson [34] , this factor limits the amount of data that can be sent securely using AES-GCM.
Security bounds for TLS
Based on their suggestion to send at most 2 24.5 fragments with the same key (itself based on a proof by [9] for the UF-1CMA security of GHASH that avoids the full PRF-PRP switching loss), our implementation may automatically trigger TLS re-keying after sending 2 24.5 fragments. This strategy results in the bound in the last row, which no longer depends quadratically on q e and thus achieves a poor man's form of beyond birthday bound security.
VIII. THE TLS 1.3 RECORD PROTOCOL Figure 4 presents the TLS 1.3 protocol from draft-19, focusing only on how it drives the record layer. In particular, this presentation ignores most of the details of the
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where handshake. Figure 1 in Section I illustrates the sub-protocol streams from the point of view of the client. Upon completing the handshake, the server also installs k c 1 for decryption. After this point, the connection is fully established and both parties use the installed application traffic keys for all content types: AppData, Alert, and even Handshake messages (such as KeyUpdate).
Later, the client (or the server) can terminate their current output stream by sending either a KeyUpdate handshake message or a close-notify alert message. In the first case, it installs and starts using the next application traffic key k Handshake Keys:
Handshake Complete
Handshake Complete enc clearly indicates its final fragment. 0-RTT data ends with an end-of-early-data message; encrypted handshake messages in both directions end with the finished message; 0.5 and 1-RTT data streams end with a key update or a close-notify alert. This precaution ensures that any truncations at the end of a stream will cause a connection failure, rather than continuing with the next stream.
Performance/Security Trade-Offs. 0-RTT and 0.5-RTT significantly decrease communications latency, but they yield weaker application security. 0-RTT traffic has weaker forward secrecy and is subject to replays: if multiple servers may accept the connection and (as usual) do not share an anti-replay cache, then they may all receive and process (prefixes of) the same early traffic data. This motivates our model with multiple decryptors, and also requires the server application to defer some effects of early-data processing till handshake completion. Also, since data is sent before ciphersuite negotiation, the client may use relatively weak algorithms (or broken implementations) that the server would otherwise have a chance to refuse. 0.5-RTT incurs similar, lesser risks as the server sends data before the handshake completes. The server is subject to 0-RTT truncation attacks if it starts sending data before receiving the client's end of early data. Also, if the server relies on a client signature, it should not send sensitive data before handshake completion. In contrast with 0-RTT, sending 0.5-RTT traffic is a local configuration issue for the server; the client receives 0.5-RTT data after completing the handshake and does not distinguish it from 1-RTT data. TLS 1.2 is routinely deployed with 'FalseStart', which is similar to 0.5-RTT but in the other direction, the client may locally decide to start sending encrypted application data as soon as it can compute the keys, before handshake completion. This places additional trust in the client's ciphersuite whitelist, inasmuch as sensitive data may be sent before confirming their correct negotiation with the server.
A Minimal Record Game Next, we present a simplified, more liberal model of the Record that seeks to abstract away from the details of how the connection evolves. This facilitates the statement of a standalone 'record-layer' theorem, but our approach similarly applies to our full F implementation integrated with miTLS, which carefully keeps track of the sequence of keys, as outlined at the end of this section.
We abstract the state of the connection by a context bitstring; as the handshake progresses, we concatenate more relevant handshake parameters to the context. For instance, after ClientHello, the context consists of the client's nonce n C and its proposed ciphersuites and key exchange values; after ServerHello, it additionally contains the server nonce n S , algorithm choice, key exchange value, etc.
Instead of modeling duplex channels between clients and servers, we consider separate sequences of streams in each direction. Our game ( Figure 5 ) models re-keying and context extension for a sequence of streams (all in the same direction), covering 0-RTT, 0.5-RTT, and 1-RTT traffic, relying on the multi-instance game SE = Multi(Lhse) (see §VII).
The game has oracles Init and InitD for generating multistream encryptors and decryptors in their initial state, indexed by n and m, respectively. We assume that their arguments determine the record algorithm. Their state consist of a current context, a current stream number j, and a local map I from stream numbers to the value of the context when they were installed. We use variables ctx, j, and I to refer to the fields of E[m] and D[n], respectively.
Oracles Extend and ExtendD allow the local context to be extended (concatenated) with new information at any time.
Oracles Install and InstallD install an LHSE instance (allocating it if it does not exist) for encryption and decryption, Figure 5 . The TLS 1.3 Record Game respectively. Recall that calls to SE.Gen are memoized, so that an encryptor and a decryptor share the same stream if and only if they agree on the stream sequence number and context.
Oracles Encrypt and Decrypt apply encryption and decryption to the currently-installed stream. Some fragments are final: they terminate the stream and signal the need to install a new stream before continuing.
Definition 9 (Record):
be the advantage of an adversary A that makes at most q e encryption queries and q d decryption queries for each of the q i LHSE instances created using install queries in the game of Figure 5 .
Theorem 5 (Record reduces to Lhse):
Our game complies with the idealized interface for LHSE and relies on its conditional idealization. If b = 0, then the oracles operate purely on local state, and simply implement a real sequence of encrypted streams, under the control of the record state machine. If b = 1, then we get perfect authentication of (a prefix of) the whole sequence of streams of fragments. (This property is verified by typing our idealized record implementation.) The ctx field of encryptors and decryptor represents their implicitly authenticated shared context: unless there is an encryptor with a matching context, the ideal encryption log is empty hence decryption will fail. In particular, as soon as the context includes ServerCert-Finished, and thus the fresh TLS nonces n C and n S , we know that there is at most one encryptor and one decryptor.
More agree on the whole sequence of communicated fragment for the first j streams. By Theorem 5 these guarantees also hold for the real record for any game adversary A, except with probability Record (A).
Application to 0-RTT We briefly show how to control our game to model 0-RTT and 0.5-RTT. For 0-RTT, the client is the encryptor and the server is the decryptor. Both use the encryptor index n as initial context, representing the content of ClientHello, notably the fresh client random n C . Conversely, the decryptor index m (including the fresh server random n S ) is not included in the initial context of InitD. As both parties install their first stream (j = 0) for 0-RTT, this reflects that the underlying TLS key derivation (k c 0 in Figure 4 ) depends only on client-side information. Thus, although 0-RTT traffic is protected, it may be decrypted by multiple server instances with different indexes m.
Calls to ExtendD and Extend reflect handshake communications in the other direction, as the ServerCertFinished stream is sent and received, causing ctx to be extended with (at least) m. Afterwards, as the two parties successively install streams for the TLS keys k
. . , successful decryption guarantees agreement on a context that includes the pair n, m. Thus, in this usage of our Record game at most one server will successfully decrypt the first encrypted handshake fragment from the client, and from this point all streams are one-to-one.
Application to 0.5-RTT The server is the encryptor, the client the decryptor and, since they both have initial access to the first message exchange, we may select as index n that includes the client hello and server hello messages and implicitly authenticate the pair n C , n S . Thus, there is at most one honest client decryptor for 0.5-RTT and, from the client's viewpoint, successful decryption of the first handshake fragment ensures agreement on this context. Still (at least from the record's viewpoint) the server is not guaranteed there is a matching decryptor until it receives ClientCert-Finished in the other direction and transitions to 1-RTT.
Verified Implementation for miTLS (Outline) Our TLS Record implementation supports sequences of streams for the full protocol described in Figure 4 and its TLS 1.2 counterpart.
Stream Sequences As described in the game above, it maintains a current stream for each direction, and it receives 'extend' and 'install' commands from the handshake protocol as the connection gets established. Its indexes (ctx in the game) consist of a summary of the handshake context available at the time of key derivation (always including the algorithms to use). In contrast with our game, which models all communications in a single direction, our code supports 'duplex' communications. This is necessary, for instance, for synchronizing key updates and connection closure between clients and servers. Our code also maintains a small (typebased) state machine that controls the availability of the current streams for sending application data.
Re-keying and Corruption The state machine enforces a limit on the maximum number of fragments that can be sent with one key to prevent sequence number overflows and account for the birthday bound weakness of AES-GCM. On key updates we delete old keys and model the corruption of individual streams using leak and coerce functions for keys. This is in keeping with the static corruption modeling of MITLS, e.g. to account for insecure handshake runs.
Fragment API Our code for the record is parameterized by a type of abstract application-data plaintexts, indexed by a unique stream identifier and an apparent fragment length. Type abstraction guarantees that, if the stream identifier is safe (a property that depends on the handshake and key derivation process), the idealized TLS implementation never actually accesses their actual length and contents, a strong and simple confidentiality property.
Our API has a configuration to control 0-RTT and 0.5-RTT as the connection is created. In particular, 0-RTT plaintexts have their own type, (indexed by an identifier that describe their 0-RTT context) which should help applications treat it securely. Conversely, 0.5-RTT is modeled simply by enabling earlier encryption of 1-RTT traffic.
Message API Our code also has a higher-level API with messages as (potentially large) bytestrings instead of individual fragments. As usual with TLS, message boundaries are application specific, whereas applications tend to ignore fragment boundaries. Nonetheless, our code preserves apparent message boundaries, never caches or fragments small messages, and supports message length-hiding by taking as inputs both the apparent (maximal) size max of the message and its private (actual) size m . It has a simple fragmentation loop, apparently sending up to 2 14 bytes at each iteration, starting with max − m bytes of padding follows by the actual data. (This ensures that an application that waits for the whole message never responds before receiving the last fragment.) We do not model de-fragmentation on the receiving end; our code delivers fragments as they arrive in a buffer provided by the application for reassembling its messages.
The correctness and security of this construction on top of the fragment API is verified by typing, essentially abstracting sequences of fragments into sequences of bytes for the benefit of the application, and turning close-notify alert fragments into end-of-files. (See also [22] for a cryptographic treatment of fragmentation issues.)
IX. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate our reference implementation of the TLS record layer both qualitatively (going over the verified goals of the various modules and how they relate to the games presented in the paper, and checking that our implementation interoperates with other TLS libraries) and quantitatively (measuring the verification and runtime performance). Table II summarizes the modular structure of our code, and evaluates the verification costs and the extracted OCaml and C implementations. Since proofs and implementations are tightly interleaved in F source code, it is difficult to accurately measure a precise source overhead. The reported annotation percentages figure in the table are rough manual estimates, but they can be compared to the size of extracted implementations.
Verification evaluation
Most of the verification burden comes from the security proof of AEAD (totaling approximately 4,500 lines of annotation out of a total of about 5,500 lines of F ) and the functional correctness proof of the MAC implementations (totaling over 4,000 lines of annotations and lemmas). For the latter, we extended F with a new big number library to verify the low-level implementations of various mathematical operations (such as point multiplication on elliptic curves or multiplication over finite fields) using machinesized integers and buffers. We use it to prove the correctness of the polynomial computations for Poly1305 and GHASH.
Current limitations Our record layer implementation is part of miTLS in F : a larger, partially verified codebase that intends to provide a secure, efficient implementation for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. We leave a complete verification of the TLS 1.3 handshake and its integration with our code as future work.
Our implementation also includes the first miTLS component implemented in a lower level fragment of F that enables its extraction to C code. In contrast, the rest of miTLS is still extracted to OCaml and, until it is similarly adapted, relies on an unverified OCaml/C wrapper to call our extracted C code. Currently, this runtime transition is done at the level of the AEAD interface, enabling us to switch to other generic cryptographic providers more easily (e.g. to compare performance with OpenSSL). Hence, the TLSspecific stateful encryption in StreamAE is verified on top of an idealized AEAD interface that slightly differs from the one exported by our idealized Crypto.AEAD construction. For instance, the former represents fragments as sequences of bytes, whereas the latter uses a lower level memory Interoperability Our record implementation supports both TLS 1.3 and 1.2 and exposes them through a common API. We have tested interoperability for our TLS 1.2 record layer with all major TLS implementations. For TLS 1.3 draft-14, we tested interoperability with multiple implementations, including BoringSSL, NSS, BoGo, and Mint, at the IETF96 Hackathon. For draft-18, we tested interoperability with the latest version of Mint at the time of writing. In all cases, our clients were able to connect to interoperating servers using an ECDHE or PSK_ECDHE key exchange, then to exchange data with one of the following AEAD algorithms: AES256-GCM, AES128-GCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305. Similarly, our servers were able to accept connections from interoperating clients that support the above ciphersuites.
Performance We evaluate the performance of our record layer implementation at two levels. First, we compare our implementation of AEAD encryption extracted to C using an experimental backend for F to OpenSSL 1.1.0 compiled with the no−asm option, disabling handwritten assembly optimizations. Our test encrypts a random payload of 2 14 bytes with 12 bytes of constant associated data. We report averages over 3,000 runs on an Intel Core E5-1620v3 CPU (3.5GHz) on Windows 64-bit. Our implementation is 17 to 18 times slower than OpenSSL for AES-GCM and about 30% slower for ChaCha20-Poly1305. Note that the performance of custom assembly implementations can be significantly better. OpenSSL with assembly can perform ChaCha20-Poly1305 in about one cycle per byte and can do AES128-GCM and AES256-GCM in less than half a cycle per byte.
Next, we measure the throughput of our record layer integrated into miTLS by downloading one gigabyte of random data from a local TLS server. We compare two different integration methods: first, we extract the verified record layer in OCaml, and compile it alongside the OCaml-extracted miTLS. Then, we build an F interface to the C version of our record implementation and call it from miTLS. We compare these results with the default AEAD provider of miTLS (based on OpenSSL 1.1.0 with all optimizations, including hardware-accelerated AES), and curl (which uses OpenSSL for the full TLS protocol).
We observe that miTLS is not a limiting factor in these benchmarks as its performance using the OpenSSL implementation of AEAD encryption is comparable to that of libcurl.
Unsurprisingly, the OCaml version of our verified implementation performs very poorly. This is due to the high overhead of both memory operations and arithmetic computations in the OCaml backend of F (which uses garbage-collected lists for buffers, and arbitrary-precision zarith integers). The C extracted version is over 30,000 times faster, but remains two orders of magnitude slower than the hardware-optimized assembly implementations in OpenSSL for AES. For ChaCha20-Poly1305, we achieve 50% of the assembly-optimized OpenSSL throughput.
Although our code is optimized for verification and modularity rather than performance, we do not believe that we can close the performance gap only by improving F code for hardware-accelerated algorithms such as AES-GCM-instead, we intend to selectively link our F code with assembly code proven to correctly implement a shared functional specification. We leave this line of research for future work.
